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Abstract
Relative to security issues, Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER) has been neglected by politicians and underexplored
by academics and yet is of increasing importance. This article argues that TER is characterised by the mutual
dysfunctionality of the political agenda and its institutional structure. The traditional narrow agenda, which has
focused almost exclusively on reducing non-tariff trade barriers, is a principal reason for this. This article uses the case
of industrial and labour relations to demonstrate that greater engagement with major stakeholders and broadening
the political agenda are key to breaking the deadlock. The article also argues for institutional innovations that could in
principle be transferred to other neglected policy areas of TER.
In a relative sense Transatlantic Economic Relations (TER)
was less explored by American and European politicians
for much of the 20th century as the ideological conﬂict
of the cold war and shared security interests took prior-
ity. Since the Berlin Wall fell, in the wake of rapidly glob-
alising trade and capital and more recently with the
global recession, economic issues and interests have
naturally come to prominence and TER, with the
European Union (EU) and the United States (US) as key
players, has assumed increasing importance. To date,
however, the tangible results of TER are widely judged
as disappointing.
While TER is the most developed case of economic
interregionalism (Hänggi and Roloff, 2006) and has shown
signiﬁcant deﬁciencies, relative to the security relation-
ship, it remains largely underexplored in academic discus-
sion and analysis. This article however is not intended to
survey the existing debates of the topic or the linkages
of TER with the wider literature on interregionalism or
governance.1 It moreover seeks to place TER in its broad
economic, historical and political context, scrutinise
speciﬁc institutional and political problems associated
with TER and propose policy solutions.
This survey article argues that TER, as it currently oper-
ates, is characterised by the mutual dysfunctionality of
the political agenda and its institutional structure. It
makes the case that it is the traditional narrow politi-
cal ⁄economic agenda, focused almost exclusively on
reducing non-tariff trade barriers, which is culpable for
TER weakness. Focusing on policies and institutions and
using the speciﬁc case of industrial and labour relations,
the greater engagement with major stakeholders is iden-
tiﬁed as the key to breaking the deadlock in TER.
In order to achieve this broader engagement, the
article makes the case for institutional innovations,
setting out some key principles and proposing new
mechanisms including the creation of a new secretariat
to act as a permanent contact point and provide a vari-
ety of practical functions. The authors argue that these
innovations will not only help to address the problems
in the ﬁeld of industrial and labour relations but could
in principle also be transferred to other neglected
policy areas of TER. The policy proposals developed in
this survey article would help to overcome some of the
most important problems of TER and signiﬁcantly
improve its effectiveness. With the Obama administra-
tion in Washington and a relatively new European
Commission in place there is a window of opportunity
to reshape TER and start working on solving its prob-
lems by including a wider spectrum of interests and
stakeholders.
Transatlantic economic relations in broad
context
In a world order that was shaped by the victors of the
Second World War and the new ideological conﬂicts that
developed in its wake, transatlantic relations have been
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crucial to global stability (Wallace, 2001) and conse-
quently have formed an important part of academic
study. Common American and European security inter-
ests, organised and resourced through NATO, were prior-
itised by politicians and academics alike throughout and
since the cold war. Indeed, the attention paid in more
recent years to the so-called ‘Global War on Terrorism’
(GWOT) and the differences between US and European
approaches (Daalder, 2003) has served to divert attention
from other policy ﬁelds in which the EU and the US have
common concerns and interests. One such policy ﬁeld is
TER, which, when compared to these other features of
the relationship, has been less explored by academics
and neglected by political leaders.
Interestingly, while the political dynamics of TER reﬂect
the domestic and international political climate, there is a
limited correlation to the core economics of the partner-
ship. Pollack and Shaffer have argued that there is no
evidence that political frictions in the ﬁelds of security and
foreign policy have had any signiﬁcant impact on the vol-
ume of transatlantic trade and investment (Pollack and
Shaffer, 2006). In terms of many core indicators, the trans-
atlantic economic partnership is the biggest and arguably
still the most important one in the world. Comprising
roughly 800 million people, the US and the EU accounted
for 57 per cent of world GDP, 33 per cent of global trade
in goods and 42 per cent of trade of services in 2007
(European Commission, 2008). A research report written
for the US Congress summarised the external economic
effects of the transatlantic partnership with the conclusion
that the ‘combined weight of these two economic super-
powers means that how the US and EU manage their rela-
tionship and the difﬁcult issues involving domestic
regulations, competition policy, and foreign investment
could well help determine how the rest of the world deals
with similar issues’ (Ahearn et al., 2008, p. 3). Given a weak
framework of global governance institutions and fre-
quently unsuccessful World Trade Organization (WTO)
talks, the transatlantic relationship has the potential to
establish international economic rules – that could de
facto become global standards – using the two blocs’
combined power as the biggest producers and consumers
of goods and services in the world. And yet it has largely
failed in this task.
In historical context, transatlantic cooperation can be
traced back to the early 20th century but was ﬁrst
dragged into the political spotlight with President John F.
Kennedy’s ‘Declaration of Interdependence’. In a speech in
Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, the president claimed ‘that
the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Inter-
dependence, [and] that [the US] will be prepared to dis-
cuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming
a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneﬁcial part-
nership between the new union now emerging in Europe
and the old American Union founded … 175 years ago’
(Kennedy, 1962). Nevertheless, the transatlantic partner-
ship up until 1990 remained motivated by the shared
security concerns of the cold war.
Transatlantic relations in the economic ﬁeld would
have to wait until the collapse of the Soviet Empire. And
so it was that the ‘Transatlantic Declaration’ (TD) of 1990
became the ﬁrst ofﬁcial agreement in the new era of
transatlantic relations. A declaration of shared values, it
claimed that the US and the European Union were:
mindful of their common heritage and of their
close historical, political, economic and cultural
ties … recognizing that the transatlantic solidar-
ity has been essential for the preservation of
peace and freedom and for the development of
free and prosperous economies as well as for
the recent developments which have restored
unity in Europe (US Government, 1990).
Signiﬁcantly, the TD began the process of institutionalis-
ing the transatlantic partnership by establishing biannual
and ad hoc consultations between EU and US ofﬁcials
and ministers.
The process of institutionalisation went along with a
necessary shift in transatlantic relations from security to
economic interests. This shift of focus made the transat-
lantic partnership more complicated since the economic
policy ﬁeld was far more conﬂict ridden than the comfort-
able, shared security interests of the cold war. The new
framework focused on bringing down economic barriers
to trade but it also served to highlight the many differ-
ences in regulation and political preferences. As Barry
Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley
observed in 1998, ‘Economic globalization in the after-
math of the cold war may be causing tariffs, capital con-
trols, and transport costs to decline, but it is also putting
ﬁrms in the United States and Europe into closer competi-
tion’. He concluded that ‘policies on one side of the
Atlantic – be they central bank decisions over the interest
rate, congressional and parliamentary decisions about the
budget, or government decisions about competition and
regulatory policy – are having strong repercussions on the
other. The scope for conﬂict in such an environment is
considerable’ (Eichengreen, 1998, p. 1).
By 1995 the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’ (NTA) repre-
sented an evolution of the institutionalisation of the
bilateral partnership. Signed by US President Bill Clinton,
EU Commission President Jacques Santer and EU Council
President Felipe Gonzáles, NTA was a commitment to or-
ganised cooperation in the key strategic areas of peace
and stability, democracy and development around the
world, responding to global challenges, the expansion of
world trade and closer economic relations, and building
bridges across the Atlantic (European Union, 1995).
A series of institutional innovations was created which
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Mark Pollack described as ‘a new and novel institutional
architecture linking Washington and Brussels across a
wide range of issue-areas, representing the most system-
atic effort at genuine bilateral governance in the history
of the transatlantic partnership’ (Pollack, 2005, p. 900).
The NTA complemented the intergovernmental institu-
tionalisation of the TD by creating a variety of civil soci-
ety dialogues to strengthen Atlantic bridge building and
structured networks of lower-level ofﬁcials. After the
NTA, the institutional structure of transatlantic relations
looked as follows (Pollack, 2005).
Intergovernmental level
• Regular summit meetings between the US president
and a delegation of EU ofﬁcials (mostly the EU Commis-
sion President and the rotating Presidency of the Council
of Ministers plus the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy).
Transgovernmental level
• Transatlantic networks of lower-level US and EU ofﬁ-
cials working on foreign policy and especially economic
issues. These networks work largely unaffected by the
dynamics of transatlantic high politics.
Transnational level
• Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) – consisting of
European and American CEOs lobbying for the liberali-
sation of the transatlantic marketplace.
• Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) – network of
EU and US consumer organisations.
• Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) – dialogue of
trade unions (had only a handful of meetings but has
not been formally abolished).
• Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) – dialogue
of environmental stakeholders (ceased to exist in 2001).
• Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue (TLD) – created in
1999 as a formal response of the European Parliament
and US Congress to the NTA commitments. Its main aim
is to enhance the level of discourse between members
of the European Parliament and the US Congress.
The institutional innovations of the NTA were politically
amended by the Transatlantic Economic Partnership
(TEP) agreement of 1998, which clariﬁed the agenda of
the transatlantic economic partnership beyond doubt
(European Commission, 1998). The TEP effectively stated
that the main purpose of transatlantic economic rela-
tions was the abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade and investment (Meyer, 2008). This narrow political
agenda was to have some serious consequences for the
effectiveness of transatlantic institutions.
Structural dysfunctionality
Institutional structures are not an end in their own right
and exist to support a political agenda. And the narrow
political agenda has been at odds with the institutional
structure which, at least on the transnational level,
included a wider variety of stakeholders. In this situation,
the narrow focus on trade liberalisation and deregulation
has meant dysfunctionality in the TER process and struc-
ture because for many stakeholders in the institutions
there was nothing at stake in the agenda (or worse it
even contradicted their interests). For example, the
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) folded after just a
few meetings because trade unions believed that there
was simply nothing to gain or achieve in the framework
of a purely free-market political agenda (Compa and
Meyer, 2010). The Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue
(TED) suffered a similar fate and ceased to meet in 2001.
Even the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the
transnational dialogue with arguably the biggest interest
overlap with the TER agenda, nearly ‘ran aground’ when
it seemed increasingly difﬁcult to deliver progress in the
business community’s interest (Pollack, 2005).
There was some progress, notably in the area of
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) during the
1990s. But as Pollack and Shaffer explained, ‘In the view
of many participants, the ‘‘low-hanging fruit’’ for eco-
nomic cooperation had been picked. Governments on both
sides now found it difﬁcult to move beyond symbolic
agreements and rearguard efforts at conﬂict resolution.
Enhanced cooperation among regulators had not
prevented new and bitter trade disputes from arising’
(Pollack and Shaffer, 2006, p. 63).
It was this ineffectiveness of TER that led to the EU
Commission’s 2004 Review of the Framework for Relations
between the European Union and the United States. The
report highlighted further agenda-setting problems and
criticised the tendency of TER to become overloaded
with too many issues in very speciﬁc economic sectors
while failing to prioritise issues of strategic importance.
Insufﬁcient political ownership was another problem that
was detected by the Commission, which argued that
without renewed political commitment at the highest
level, strategic agenda setting would be impossible
(European Commission, 2004). Some of the report’s rec-
ommendations were adopted in the most recent transat-
lantic economic agreement: The Framework for Advancing
Transatlantic Economic Integration (FATEI), adopted in
April 2007, bringing innovations to the political as well as
the institutional levels. Politically, the FATEI to a degree
represented a shift of rationale, stressing the external
effects of the transatlantic partnership and arguing that
deeper transatlantic economic integration ‘will encourage
other countries to adopt the transatlantic economic
model of respect for property rights, openness to
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investment, transparency and predictability in regulation,
and the value of free markets’ (The White House, 2007).
This new awareness of the external impact of the
transatlantic economic partnership can be interpreted as
somewhat defensive in view of rising competition, espe-
cially from China, and its signiﬁcance was reﬂected in a
report of the Congressional Research Service (CRS):
‘Given quite similar interests in bolstering the multilateral
trading system, many analysts say that both sides could
cooperate more in addressing the rising challenge posed
by China’ (Ahearn et al., 2008, p. 33). The congressional
researchers made a fundamentally important point.
In view of rising economic challenges from other parts
of the world, the economic interests (especially external
ones) of the EU and US are seemingly converging.
Although the internal problems in the partnership
remain, the changing external framework might well
prove to be a driver for intensiﬁed transatlantic eco-
nomic cooperation in the future.
In institutional terms, the FATEI created the most
prominent transatlantic institution to date: the Transat-
lantic Economic Council (TEC), which represents what
the 2004 European Commission report was calling for:
new political ownership at the highest level. Permanent
TEC members are currently the European Commissioners
for External Relations and Trade as well as Internal
Market and Services. The US side is represented by the
US Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce as well as
the US Trade Representative. Upon invitation by the co-
chairs of the TEC other EU Commissioners and US cabi-
net members may take part in TEC meetings (European
Commission, 2007). In terms of its internal agenda, the
TEC focuses on regulatory cooperation in addition to
deeper integration in the areas of intellectual property
rights, trade, ﬁnancial markets, innovation and technol-
ogy as well as investment.2 What the TEC has so far
failed to address, however, is the underlying reason for
the disappointing results of TER. With a focus on labour
and industrial relations, the ﬁnal part of this article will
try to make some progress in doing so and begin to
develop political as well as institutional proposals to
overcome TER fundamental weakness.
Broadening the political agenda, labour
standards and institutional innovation
The promotion of transatlantic trade and the reduction
of barriers have been good for EU and US economic
development and should continue. In isolation, however,
‘free trade’ as a political mission or simply as a slogan
fails to reﬂect the complexity of this and other global
economic relationships. Even worse, the narrowness of
the political agenda has led to the partial dissolution of
the institutional structure and the disengagement of the
diverse stakeholders required for making TER work.
Furthermore, in reality this huge trading market cannot
be accurately described as ‘free’. After all, countries and
regions have always managed their trade relationships
with a range of tariff and non-tariff measures (most
recently during the recession, in the use of government
procurement to bolster domestic industry).
Trade has always been – directly or indirectly – con-
strained or enabled by governments and the TEC will
not be able to eliminate strategic trade policies. Indeed
such systematic failures as have been described might
be attributed to the artiﬁcial delinking of narrow trade
issues and broader social concerns such as labour rights
and standards as well as environmental issues. Were it to
adopt the more sophisticated mission of managing
transatlantic trade relations rather than simply pursuing
the singular and unachievable goal of abolishing all
trade barriers, the TEC could make some progress in
addressing TER dysfunctionality. Tackling this problem
would require an inversion of the current dynamics.
Instead of pushing stakeholders out of the process with
an all too narrow political agenda, the broadening of it
would give stakeholders new incentives to participate in
a process which would then also address issues of a
wider political nature. In doing this, the TEC would be
able to make progress in prioritising issues of strategic
importance and broaden the political ownership of TER.
In view of the history and performance of TER described
above, such an evolution of mission and broadening of
focus would appear to be a prerequisite if the process is
to be reinvigorated.
Such a broadening of the political agenda would how-
ever also require a widening of the institutional struc-
ture. This article takes the area of industrial and labour
relations as a case study to illustrate this need. Simply
reinstating the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue as a regular
meeting between trade union representatives even in
the framework of a broader TER would not adequately
represent industrial and labour relations issues. As Pro-
fessor Lance Compa of the Industrial and Labor Relations
School of Cornell University made clear in a recent
report, there are a variety of issues in transatlantic indus-
trial relations, including International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) standards compliance, the undermining of the
right of union representation to gain competitive advan-
tage and the regulatory arbitrage of multinational ﬁrms
operating in both regions, which participants would
want to see addressed in the TEC framework if it is to
claim relevance (Compa and Meyer, 2010). An institu-
tionalised trade union dialogue alone would not be able
to achieve this.
Therefore, in order to integrate properly industrial and
labour relations issues in the TER framework, a compre-
hensive code of conduct for ﬁrms involved in transatlan-
tic trade needs to be developed and agreed. Such a new
code of conduct representing broader political concerns
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needs to be monitored by a reformed institutional struc-
ture. Essential reforms include bringing the EU Commis-
sioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
as well as the US Labor Department’s director of the
International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) and the US
State Department’s Assistant Secretary for Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (DRL) into the TEC as perma-
nent members. Furthermore, the re-establishment of the
TALD as a coordinating institution and the provision of a
dedicated secretariat to fulﬁl a variety of practical func-
tions would also prove to be indispensable (Compa and
Meyer, 2010).
Given insufﬁcient take-up by the wider G20, TEC is a
central forum for the EU and US in setting benchmarks
for labour and industrial standards. The establishment of
a permanent secretariat is above all targeted at opera-
tionalising industrial and labour relations issues in the
framework of the TEC, linking them into existing mecha-
nisms and procedures and with political institutions such
as Congress, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the ILO.
The speciﬁc tasks of the secretariat should include:
• reviewing and evaluating multinational company
management’s internal systems of due diligence,
communication and social performance;
• conducting an annual Labour Information Audit on
the state of labour rights and standards in ﬁrms
involved in transatlantic trade and investment (not-
ing, for example, whether ﬁrms have been found in
violation of national labour laws or international
labour standards to which both the EU and US have
subscribed);
• collaborating with the ILO to advance the Decent
Work Agenda, ﬁnding ways for the TEC to ‘lead by
example’ in fostering decent work in the context of
transatlantic trade and investment;
• receiving complaints, conducting investigations and
issuing ﬁndings and recommendations on alleged vio-
lations of the code of conduct and its principles; and
• recommending harmonised GSP and other preferen-
tial trade policies for developing countries’ exports to
the US and EU to ensure that ILO core labour stan-
dards and other international human rights norms
are respected in those countries (Compa and Meyer,
2010).
In effect, what is needed to improve the workings of TER
is the adoption of a broader political agenda in transat-
lantic agreements, which provides all stakeholders with
motivational inﬂuence, together with the legal and insti-
tutional structure to make such a programme work. In
the case presented above, including industrial and
labour standards in agreements would not even entail
new commitments by either the EU or the US but
merely the restatement of existing commitments in a
new context. Such a move would however reinforce the
value of those commitments, especially if accompanied
by the introduction of monitorial institutions.
The key principles outlined above are not limited to
industrial and labour relations issues but would also
work in other vital policy areas that should have a place
on the TER agenda, for instance environmental concerns.
Conclusions
In the absence of capable global governance structures,
interregionalism has an important governance role to
play in an increasingly multipolar world. The transatlantic
relationship is the most advanced interregional connec-
tion and therefore an important role model. It must not
be allowed to fail. The thematic and institutional widen-
ing of the relationship – above all by including social
and environmental issues – is fundamental to preventing
this from happening.
The strategic importance of the transatlantic economic
partnership means that its historic dysfunctionality can-
not be ignored. This article has sought to explain that its
deﬁciencies lie in a too narrow agenda, focused almost
exclusively on matters of deregulation, the continued
concentration on which is unlikely to create the neces-
sary political ownership to make transatlantic economic
cooperation more effective and live up to its potential
and responsibility. Focusing on policy and institutions,
with reference to labour and industrial standards, this
article also argued that widening the TEC’s mission to
engage key stakeholders currently excluded and
acknowledging the social dimension now largely ignored
would go some way to making TER work. To support
this, a series of institutional innovations, including the
creation of a new secretariat as a permanent contact
point, would be a practical requirement. The underlying
rationale of these proposals could also be replicated in
other crucial and underrepresented policy areas of the
transatlantic relationship. TER is a laboratory for eco-
nomic governance mechanisms and we think that we
have outlined a worthwhile experiment.
Notes
1. For a broader overview of the existing TER literature and speciﬁc
case studies please refer to Damro, 2006; Denton, 1999; Egan,
2005; Petersmann and Pollack, 2003; Pollock and Shaffer, 2001.
2. EU–USA Transatlantic Economic Council. Available from: http://ec.
europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/
usa/transatlantic-economic-council/index_en.htm [Accessed 26
April 2010].
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